highly ranking civil servants and officers never take refreshment in the chaykhanas or worship in the town mosques. They do not visit the homes of the townsman or attend their festivals, although, being men of substance, they may send gifts to their Kurdish neighbors on such occasions. The dividing line is to be found in the teachers, who constitute something of a separate group, looked down on by the higher officials and officers and flattered by the townspeople, perhaps, to some extent, because they exercise great control over the destinies of the sons of the town. It is possible to observe a teacher in deep conversation with some respected merchant in the bazar. One must digress to report that one of the teachers in Rowanduz fell in love with and married a girl of the town, undistinguished either in the wealth or the occupation of her father, much to the delight of her parents and against the advice and scorn of his colleagues and superiors. This created an anamolous, almost unheard-of situation, breaking down, as it did, the barrier between "educated aristocrat" and commoner, and the teacher is still subject to criticism, not solely on the part of the official class, although he shares much more extensively than his fellows in the social life of the townspeople.

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One of the most salient characteristics of the official class is that it considers itself, with some justice, to be the most "progressive," not only in Kurdistan but in Iraq at large, judged, to a large extent, in terms

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the tribal leader retains longest in the face of breakdown of tribal organization (cf. Memni, p. 126). The ability to avoid or resolve such conflicts between villages is a prerequisite for the maintenance of lineage unity, and it is therefore essential that the principle of collective responsibility is *not* applied to the co-residents of the village community. 614 628

Leach (op. cit., pp. 56-7) discusses a feud between two competing lineages in the Rowanduz area. Though in effect a struggle for political supremacy between rival lineages, it appears to be governed by ideas of retaliation and equality. Hay (op. cit.) further lists the traditionally stipulated blood money to be paid for various classes of people. The Rowanduz area, as contrasted to Southern Kurdistan, is one where a number of well-organized lineages are in close contact. This is due in part to a difference in local history. Suleimani is an old center, and the whole territory was long subject to the feudal Baban administration, based on non-lineage principles. The Rowanduz mountain areas, on the other hand, retained a presumably characteristic tribal organization, with numerous territorially separate, independent lineages till quite late, when it was united by conquest in a larger state system under the Mir og Rowanduz around 1830. It is interesting to speculate whether the fusion of numerous lineages into a larger state may not have changed some of the factors outlined above in such a way as to permit the institutionalized extension of the South Kurdish pattern of personal revenge to a pattern of blood feud. 178 628

In Southern Kurdistan, it is difficult to see what sanctions would be brought to bear against homicide within the maximal lineage, other than this pattern of personal revenge. Other mechanisms, once existing, may however have been disguised by now through the activities of the external administration. 621 626 682